Chinese Agrarian Change and Agriculture in Today’s Tibet

Chinese Agrarian Change
Ever since 1951, immediately after China occupied Tibet, a series of changes were imposed. These agrarian changes can be studied under three different phases. The first stage, Democratic Reform (1951-1965), was short-lived and the implementation of the second stage began half way through the 1960s. By 1975, the major objective of the second stage of establishing communes was 93 per cent completed (Grunfeld 1987).

Phase I: 1951-1962

The first phase was marked by the distribution of estate livestock among nomad households and the formation of nomad “Mutual Aid Teams”. Soon class-struggles began because the whole community was divided on the basis of an “exploitation index” into five categories of nomads— lord, rich, middle, lower middle and poor. Changes in cultural freedom, trade and transport were also taking place in pastoral areas (Tsundue1999a). However, despite these changes, the situation instead of improving worsened due to political instability, heavy taxation, the ban of the traditional barter system,inexperienced leadership and more so due to curtailing cultural freedoms. The result was that, like in many farming areas, the pastoral community experienced food grain short ages and declining livestock heads which encouraged the agrarian resistance movement.

Phase II: 1965-1982

In the midst of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), communes were radically imposed and land, animals and even properties which had been distributed during the “democratic reform” of Phase I were taken back by the communes. Livestock were owned by communes, without any private ownership, and net income was distributed according to the labour contributed by an individual in the form of work points (Tsundue 1999b). Agricultural planning and decision-making was made at a high level of organisation and plans were implemented by farmers and nomads through a multi-tiered hierarchial system. The agricultural policy changed frequently and production growth-rates and net returns remained low. Because the economic reality was often disregarded and surpluses were appropriated, farmers lacked enthusiasm for the methods of increasing production (ICIMOD 1988). Most of the produce was forcibly collected as patriotic grains tax, compulsory livestock sales tax, military tax and famine protection tax. The remaining harvest was “purchased” at a nominal price by the Chinese government; this was rarely paid, the claimants being told the money had gone towards maintenance of the communes (Choephel 1976).

Failure of harvests and the export of grain and meat to China led to famines in the early 1960s. During this phase, impossible quotas were imposed to increase crop yields and multiply the number of livestock in total disregard to the carrying capacity of arable land and grazing pastures. Carrying capacity is defined as the maximum density of domesticated livestock that a particular pasture can support without the risk of degradation (Aggarwal et. al 1993). Farmers, at that time in communes, increased the cultivation of marginal lands and grew high yield wheats which were unsuitable for local conditions or needs. These wheats were unable to tolerate severe highland winters and affected the traditional barley cropping system. Inappropriate Chinese methods of increasing foodcrop and livestock production during the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in the widespread destruction of Tibet’s fragile grasslands. The increased number of livestock on limited grasslands led to overgrazing of Tibet’s pastures (Zhang 1989). This was one of the major ecological disasters generated by the Great Leap Forward policy of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong (US Embassy 1996b).

Phase III: 1981-1989
After the death of Mao in 1976, the much-awaited liberal policy of “Household Responsibility System” (HRS) was introduced. This third phase of agricultural experimentation was implemented in 1982 in Tibet. Under this policy communes were disbanded, every able-bodied person received an equal share of livestock and land, each household was entitled to be rewarded in the case of over-quota production, decisions were given to farmers, taxes exempted, people could retain part of their surplus produce and private ownership flourished.

The HRS provided opportunities for farmers to return to traditional crops and their methods of agriculture, based on socio-economic demands was supported by technical improvements (Zhang 1989). Unfortunately this phase lasted only around seven years.

In 1989 the policy was reversed and restrictions were བྷimposed once again by bringing agriculture under a centralised system of intensification of land use to produce grain surpluses for the benefit of “the state”.

AGRICULTURE IN TODAY’S TIBET
In Tibet, planning and development of agriculture has remained centralised in the 1990s and there is no freedom of land-use. Grain quota systems, a multitude of taxes and intensive farming have all contributed to a loss of freedom and incentive for Tibetan farmers. High altitude overgrazing and intensive agricultural production has resulted in the loss of many medicinal herbs and food plants, and has destroyed much of the winter food supplies for wildlife. Overgrazing has also caused wind and water erosion which has led to further desertification of the Tibetan Plateau. For example, 272 million hectares of land which is 17.03 per cent of ‘TAR’ has been turned into desert (Tibet Daily 1998a). Desertification is caused by a variety of factors; mainly from conversion of land for agricultural purposes, clearfelling of forests and overgrazing in grassland areas.

According to Beijing, development means raising productivity, capital accumulation and investment. Thousands of skilled and unskilled Chinese workers are being transferred into Tibet in the name of “development”. Tibetans see development projects simply as a case of misguided aid applied by the Chinese government designed to benefit only Chinese migrants. Wheat and rice which China had to import that fed the growing Chinese immigrant population in Lhasa were subsidised by the Chinese government at a staggering cost.

Resistance still exists in rural areas against intensified monoculture, heavy taxation, the livestock compulsory slaughter quota, the inappropriate state procurement policy, lapses in price reform and other policies. For the agriculturists, these issues reach to the heart of food security and sustainable rural life.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Widespread Taxation
A huge amount of tax is charged from the nomads to graze animals on the land. The amount of the tax depends on the size of the land and family. Each year, US$5 is collected from every individual between 15 – 60 years old which is supposed to benefit them during their old age. An education tax of one yak and two sheep is collected even from nomads who have never attended schools — for which the price they get is less than half the market price (Bidhartsang 1998).

Rigid Quota System
Since the reversal of the HRS policy in 1989, China has once again imposed a rigid quota system, whereby farmers must adhere strictly to the government’s policy of cropping system with the risk of food security. They are forcibly required to sell 250 kilogram of grain and mustard oil seeds irrespective of the size of the family. Nomads are forced to sell their animal products like khulu (soft fur) and slaughter cattle. Some families, however, do not possess enough livestock to fulfill the quota and are forced to purchase sheep and goats from others.Under such policies, in order to fulfil their grain quota, farmers are forced to buy grains at the market price for which they are paid a compulsory purchase price by the state or at times do not receive any compensation at all (Bidhartsang 1998).

Fencing and Privatisation
Although the policy of reform since the late 1970s has led to nomads being able to re-establish some features of their traditional economy, policy measures are increasingly focusing on “modernisation” which drive a process of dividing up land by fencing it and settling nomads has been under way since the mid 1980s in Qinghai. The Ninth Five Year Plan ( 1996-2000) for the ‘TAR’ includes provisions for the development of five million mu (335,000 hectares) of enclosed pastures. However, Xinhua News Agency has reported that fenced pasture exceeded 10 million mu (Dorje and Tsering 1999).

In 1998 Qi Jingfa, China’s vice minister for agriculture, said that all herdmen were expected to end the nomadic life by the end of the century and that in Qinghai province 67 per cent of herdsmen have already settled into houses (Xinhua 1998i). Although the introduction of fencing helps to some extent in the recovery of degraded pasture, it often leads to disputes over boundaries and resentments over its cost (Xinhua 1998i). Commercialisation of pastoral-nomadism is a serious issue. The World Bank and policymakers approve further commercialisation of pastoral nomadism through “scientific management” of grasslands and present strategies to overcome local cultural “obstacles” (Lafitte 1998b).

Documented interviews with Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala verify that there is widespread concern over the policy of fencing and the permanent settlement of nomadic communities. Natural movement of livestock has been practiced by the nomads for centuries but this policy change has caused social conflicts among Tibetan herding communities leading to regional instability and sometimes even the loss of life. At least 29 Tibetan nomads lost their lives due to a series of armed clashes over pasture lands (TIN 1999c).

SOCIAL ISSUES

Feeding Chinese settlers
The inequality of food subsidies makes living in ‘TAR’ more attractive to Chinese settlers while making it harder for poor Tibetans to survive in the way to which they were traditionally accustomed. Most of the subsidised items are foodstuff that is preferred by Chinese settlers rather than Tibetans. The staple diet of Tibetans is barley; however, it is only the two grains forming the staple diet of the majority of Chinese immigrants — rice and wheat — that are subsidised.

Shifting Policies
The Chinese government’s frequent changes in policy have severely affected the livelihood of Tibetan pastoralists. Since 1949, ill-conceived policies were enforced which ignored local conditions and were aimed at growing crops  particularly grain crops — in all regions regardless of climatic and land conditions. Traditional production systems suited to local conditions were abandoned (Bidhartsang 1998).

Compulsory Fertiliser Purchase
New regulations require farmers to increase wheat production, especially winter wheat, which requires heavy applications of chemical fertiliser that Tibetan farmers believe depletes the soil (Grunfeld 1987). However, they are compelled to purchase fertiliser at fixed state prices, as part payment for grain procured by state trading companies.This reduces their income, their power to pay for health and education benefits and discourages organic farming.

Increasing Human Pressure
According to Qu, Chairman of the Environment Protection Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress, and Li, an advisor to the Chinese National Environment Protection Agency: A delicate balance exists between human population density and biomass productivity. By internationally accepted standards, a typical grassland area may support five persons per sq.km. On an average, Inner Mongolia’s population density is home to 15 persons per sq.km. If that density is taken as a standard, the eastern regions of Tibet, which have absorbed the Chinese influx, now mostly support excessive numbers.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Overgrazing
The stocking rates on the Tibetan grasslands are today being pushed to the limit as a result of the 36 per cent increase in China’s herds (ICJ 1997). As a result, pastures are overgrazed in many areas and livestock have difficulty in finding nutritious pasture and have consequently lost weight. For examexample, in Amdo, the average weight of an adult yak dropped from 112 kilograms in 1965 to 40 kg in 1981 (64 percent decrease).

Specific cases of grassland degradation are related to extensive areas being enclosed for Chinese settlers and farmers. Such interventions affect the nomads’ traditional migration patterns and restrict them to ever-smaller areas which leads to conditions of irreversible damage. This deterioration has reached a point where if conservation measures are not taken soon, the longterm continuity of nomadic Tibetan civilisation is threatened.

Degradation of Grassland
The most significant threat to the herders is the increasing level of grassland degradation as the pastures are no longer able to produce sufficient cover to feed livestock. Although there are no reliable figures for the extent of the degradation of grassland, some reports have quoted percentages of a loss of between 17.2 per cent (Xinhua 1998j) and over 30 per cent (US Embassy 1996d) of grassland in the ‘TAR’.

Official Chinese literature blames it on the grazing traditions of the nomads. But it is an irrefutable fact that nomads’ traditional pasture strategies have allowed them to survive and prosper for centuries on the high plateau. So inappropriate goverment policies are to blame for grassland degradation..

Seasonal Pasture Shortages
Even though the Tibetan nomads have accumulated a wealth of experience in the use of rangelands and seasonal migration management systems are well adapted to local conditions, many problems like shortages of pastures have arisen from uneven distribution of seasonal pastures. This shortage of such pastures has led to overstocking in winter areas and, therefore, insufficient nutritional provisions for the livestock during the winter (Wu 1997).

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND NEEDS
Tibet’s population will continue to grow through Chinese migration at a relatively high rate and the consumption level of the population will increase, while the availability of land suitable for agriculture remains limited. But the prospect will not be so bleak if policy correction is embarked upon to redress the problems now.

The degradation of agricultural resources can no longerbe regarded solely as a localised problem since the implications are widespread, affecting regional, national and international interests. Intensive use of land through changing land-use patterns should be encouraged, provided the interests of Tibetans and environmental conditions are taken into consideration. Also there is the need to encourage diversification of income for farmers through off-farm activities.

The Chinese government’s centralised agricultural policy should be decentralised since it entirely ignores Tibet’s local conditions, environment and the habits of the people. Increases in agricultural yields also depend upon improved agricultural techniques and not only on bringing more land under agriculture. This will require considerable new investment in the land and people skills. Training should be provided for Tibetans to use better agricultural tools and techniques. Studies on farmers’ behaviour also should be made as this plays an important role in agricultural and rural development.

Protection of grassland is vital to the survival of Tibetans. There is a need for educational conservation programmes which convey the spiritual and economic benefits of good resource management. Such programmes should involve Tibetans, natural resource experts and others. Issues of overgrazing and degraded ranges can be addressed through joint efforts of herders and researchers, so that rangeland ecosystems and pastoral production systems will be better understood and conserved in the future.

Tibetan pastoralists’ experience and deep understanding of the environment should govern policy decisions about grassland management. Policy reforms at all levels should consider the basic needs of local people and provide direct economic benefits to them. Incentives for rural development must be oriented towards improving living standards and conserving biodiversity.

Studies on the environment and development of the Tibetan Plateau are essential not only to fill the enormous gaps of knowledge on these dynamic, millennia-old ecosystems, but also to provide data that will enable the evaluation, by rational methods, of sustainable development strategies.

The preservation of nomads’ extensive traditional knowledge of their natural environment, as well as the breeding and management skills of domestic and wild animals, remains vital. This knowledge should be fully investigated and integrated into the planning and implementation of development projects.

Herd diversification should be practised as an insurance against major outbreaks of disease, since different domestic species are generally not susceptible to the same pathogens. Strengthening a sense of community and personal responsibility is the key to the conservation of biodiversity and the rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems. The use and conservation of rangeland ecosystems should be the exclusive responsibility of Tibetan people.

CONCLUSION
Agriculture has historically been the primary source of live livelihood for over 80 per cent of the total population of Tibet. Until the late 1950s, Tibetans survived on the principle Tibetan crop, barley, plus vegetables, meat and animal bi-products. Trade was based on a barter system where the nomads exchanged their products like wool and salt for grains from farmers. The systems of agriculture and trade prior to the Chinese occupation sustained both humans and nature to a much greater degree.

Due to the Chinese occupation, Tibetans are now facing many hardships like food scarcity, heavy taxation, centralised and frequent changes of policy, lack of Tibetan participation in “development projects” and the transfer of thousands of Chinese settlers. All changes were introduced in the guise of “modernisation” and “development of Tibet and Tibetans”.

Although the Chinese government forced the cultivation of winter wheat on marginal lands, coaxing Tibetans away from their staple crop of barley, this crop change failed as it was unsuitable for local conditions. All the agricultural planning and decision-making in Tibet today is imposed from above. Production growth rates and net returns remain low because farmers receive no incentives for increasing production. Most of the produce is forcibly collected as taxes in various forms.

The issue of grassland in Tibet is centred around the sustainability of pastoral-nomadism which hitherto depended  on the policies that would support restoration and preservation of a sound grassland ecosystem. Over 60 per cent of pastoral-nomadic counties in the ‘TAR’ are faced with extensive rangeland degradation caused by overgrazing, imbalances in the grassland food chain and the Chinese policy encouraging commercial exploitation of rangelands.

For the future it is important that the present arable land and pastures are conserved and utilised by following appropriate cropping patterns and grassing systems, as Tibet has the potential to meet future demands for food selfsufficiency and other basic needs. The most fundamental requirement is that there must be clarity and consistency on land policies so that farmers and nomads feel secure about their land rights. Agricultural sectors should be gradually decentralised while drastic revisions are needed in the areas of cropping patterns and price reforms. The active participation of both the farmers and nomads in all aspects
of the development process is necessary.

Source: Tibet 2000 Environment and Development Issues/DIIR