{"id":779,"date":"2014-07-25T15:53:44","date_gmt":"2014-07-25T10:23:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tibetnature.lhasocialwork.com\/en\/?p=779"},"modified":"2014-07-29T09:33:07","modified_gmt":"2014-07-29T04:03:07","slug":"chinese-agrarian-change-agriculture-todays-tibet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/chinese-agrarian-change-agriculture-todays-tibet\/","title":{"rendered":"Chinese Agrarian Change and Agriculture in Today’s Tibet"},"content":{"rendered":"

Chinese Agrarian Change<\/strong>
\nEver since 1951, immediately after China occupied Tibet,\u00a0a series of changes were imposed. These agrarian changes\u00a0can be studied under three different phases. The first stage,\u00a0Democratic Reform (1951-1965), was short-lived and the\u00a0implementation of the second stage began half way through\u00a0the 1960s. By 1975, the major objective of the second\u00a0stage of establishing communes was 93 per cent completed\u00a0(Grunfeld 1987).<\/p>\n

Phase I: 1951-1962<\/strong><\/p>\n

The first phase was marked by the distribution of estate\u00a0livestock among nomad households and the formation of\u00a0nomad \u201cMutual Aid Teams\u201d. Soon class-struggles began\u00a0because the whole community was divided on the basis of\u00a0an \u201cexploitation index\u201d into five categories of nomads\u2014\u00a0lord, rich, middle, lower middle and poor. Changes in cultural\u00a0freedom, trade and transport were also taking place in pastoral\u00a0areas (Tsundue1999a). However, despite these changes, the\u00a0situation instead of improving worsened due to political instability,\u00a0heavy taxation, the ban of the traditional barter\u00a0system,inexperienced leadership and more so due to curtailing\u00a0cultural freedoms. The result was that, like in many farming\u00a0areas, the pastoral community experienced food grain short\u00a0ages and declining livestock heads\u00a0which encouraged the agrarian\u00a0resistance movement.<\/p>\n

Phase II: 1965-1982<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the midst of the Cultural\u00a0Revolution (1966-1976), communes\u00a0were radically imposed\u00a0and land, animals and even\u00a0properties which had been\u00a0distributed during the \u201cdemocratic\u00a0reform\u201d of Phase I were\u00a0taken back by the communes.\u00a0Livestock were owned by\u00a0communes, without any private\u00a0ownership, and net income was\u00a0distributed according to the\u00a0labour contributed by an\u00a0individual in the form of work\u00a0points (Tsundue 1999b).\u00a0Agricultural planning and decision-making was made at a\u00a0high level of organisation and plans were implemented by\u00a0farmers and nomads through a multi-tiered hierarchial\u00a0system. The agricultural policy changed frequently and\u00a0production growth-rates and net returns remained low.\u00a0Because the economic reality was often disregarded and surpluses\u00a0were appropriated, farmers lacked enthusiasm for\u00a0the methods of increasing production (ICIMOD 1988).\u00a0Most of the produce was forcibly collected as patriotic grains\u00a0tax, compulsory livestock sales tax, military tax and famine\u00a0protection tax. The remaining harvest was \u201cpurchased\u201d at\u00a0a nominal price by the Chinese government; this was rarely\u00a0paid, the claimants being told the money had gone towards\u00a0maintenance of the communes (Choephel 1976).<\/p>\n

Failure of harvests and the export of grain and meat to\u00a0China led to famines in the early 1960s.\u00a0During this phase, impossible quotas were imposed to\u00a0increase crop yields and multiply the number of livestock in\u00a0total disregard to the carrying capacity of arable land and\u00a0grazing pastures. Carrying capacity is defined as the maximum\u00a0density of domesticated livestock that a particular pasture\u00a0can support without the risk of degradation (Aggarwal\u00a0et. al 1993). Farmers, at that time in communes, increased\u00a0the cultivation of marginal lands and grew high yield wheats\u00a0which were unsuitable for local conditions or needs. These\u00a0wheats were unable to tolerate severe highland winters and\u00a0affected the traditional barley cropping system.\u00a0Inappropriate Chinese methods of increasing foodcrop\u00a0and livestock production during the late 1950s and early\u00a01960s resulted in the widespread destruction of Tibet\u2019s\u00a0fragile grasslands. The increased number of livestock on\u00a0limited grasslands led to overgrazing of Tibet\u2019s pastures\u00a0(Zhang 1989). This was one of the major ecological disasters\u00a0generated by the Great Leap Forward policy of late\u00a0Chinese leader Mao Zedong (US Embassy 1996b).<\/p>\n

Phase III: 1981-1989<\/strong>
\nAfter the death of Mao in 1976, the much-awaited liberal\u00a0policy of \u201cHousehold Responsibility System\u201d (HRS) was\u00a0introduced. This third phase of agricultural experimentation\u00a0was implemented in 1982 in Tibet. Under this policy communes\u00a0were disbanded, every able-bodied person received\u00a0an equal share of livestock and land, each household was\u00a0entitled to be rewarded in the case of over-quota production,\u00a0decisions were given to farmers, taxes exempted, people\u00a0could retain part of their surplus produce and private\u00a0ownership flourished.<\/p>\n

The HRS provided opportunities for farmers to return\u00a0to traditional crops and their methods of agriculture, based\u00a0on socio-economic demands was supported by technical improvements\u00a0(Zhang 1989). Unfortunately this phase lasted\u00a0only around seven years.<\/p>\n

In 1989 the policy was reversed and restrictions were \u0f57imposed once again by bringing agriculture under a\u00a0centralised system of intensification of land use to produce\u00a0grain surpluses for the benefit of \u201cthe state\u201d.<\/p>\n

AGRICULTURE IN TODAY\u2019S TIBET<\/strong>
\nIn Tibet, planning and development of agriculture has remained\u00a0centralised in the 1990s and there is no freedom of\u00a0land-use. Grain quota systems, a multitude of taxes and\u00a0intensive farming have all contributed to a loss of freedom\u00a0and incentive for Tibetan farmers. High altitude overgrazing\u00a0and intensive agricultural production has resulted in the loss\u00a0of many medicinal herbs and food plants, and has destroyed\u00a0much of the winter food supplies for wildlife. Overgrazing\u00a0has also caused wind and water erosion which has led to\u00a0further desertification of the Tibetan Plateau. For example,\u00a0272 million hectares of land which is 17.03 per cent of\u00a0\u2018TAR\u2019 has been turned into desert (Tibet Daily 1998a).\u00a0Desertification is caused by a variety of factors; mainly from\u00a0conversion of land for agricultural purposes, clearfelling of\u00a0forests and overgrazing in grassland areas.<\/p>\n

According to Beijing, development means raising productivity,\u00a0capital accumulation and investment. Thousands\u00a0of skilled and unskilled Chinese workers are being\u00a0transferred into Tibet in the name of \u201cdevelopment\u201d.\u00a0Tibetans see development projects simply as a case of misguided\u00a0aid applied by the Chinese government designed to\u00a0benefit only Chinese migrants. Wheat and rice which China\u00a0had to import that fed the growing Chinese immigrant\u00a0population in Lhasa were subsidised by the Chinese\u00a0government at a staggering cost.<\/p>\n

Resistance still exists in rural areas against intensified\u00a0monoculture, heavy taxation, the livestock compulsory\u00a0slaughter quota, the inappropriate state procurement policy,\u00a0lapses in price reform and other policies. For the agriculturists,\u00a0these issues reach to the heart of food security and\u00a0sustainable rural life.<\/p>\n

ECONOMIC ISSUES<\/strong><\/p>\n

Widespread Taxation<\/strong>
\nA huge amount of tax is charged from the\u00a0nomads to graze animals on the land. The\u00a0amount of the tax depends on the size of the\u00a0land and family. Each year, US$5 is collected\u00a0from every individual between 15 – 60 years\u00a0old which is supposed to benefit them during\u00a0their old age. An education tax of one yak and two sheep is\u00a0collected even from nomads who have never attended\u00a0schools \u2014 for which the price they get is less than half the\u00a0market price (Bidhartsang 1998).<\/p>\n

Rigid Quota System<\/strong>
\nSince the reversal of the HRS policy in 1989, China has\u00a0once again imposed a rigid quota system, whereby farmers\u00a0must adhere strictly to the government\u2019s policy of cropping\u00a0system with the risk of food security. They are forcibly\u00a0required to sell 250 kilogram of grain and mustard oil seeds\u00a0irrespective of the size of the family. Nomads are forced to\u00a0sell their animal products like khulu (soft fur) and slaughter\u00a0cattle. Some families, however, do not possess enough livestock\u00a0to fulfill the quota and are forced to purchase sheep\u00a0and goats from others.Under such policies, in order to fulfil their grain quota,\u00a0farmers are forced to buy grains at the market price\u00a0for\u00a0which they are paid a compulsory purchase price by\u00a0the state or at times do not receive any compensation\u00a0at all (Bidhartsang 1998).<\/p>\n

Fencing and Privatisation<\/strong>
\nAlthough the policy of reform since the late 1970s\u00a0has led to nomads being able to re-establish some\u00a0features of their traditional economy, policy measures\u00a0are increasingly focusing on \u201cmodernisation\u201d which\u00a0drive a process of dividing up land by fencing it and\u00a0settling nomads has been under way since the mid 1980s\u00a0in Qinghai. The Ninth Five Year Plan ( 1996-2000)\u00a0for the \u2018TAR\u2019 includes provisions for the development\u00a0of five million mu (335,000 hectares) of enclosed\u00a0pastures. However, Xinhua News Agency has reported\u00a0that fenced pasture exceeded 10 million mu (Dorje and\u00a0Tsering 1999).<\/p>\n

In 1998 Qi Jingfa, China\u2019s vice minister for agriculture,\u00a0said that all herdmen were expected to end the nomadic life\u00a0by the end of the century and that in Qinghai province 67\u00a0per cent of herdsmen have already settled into houses (Xinhua\u00a01998i).\u00a0Although the introduction of fencing\u00a0helps to some extent in the recovery of\u00a0degraded pasture, it often leads to disputes\u00a0over boundaries and resentments over its\u00a0cost (Xinhua 1998i). Commercialisation of\u00a0pastoral-nomadism is a serious issue. The\u00a0World Bank and policymakers approve further\u00a0commercialisation of pastoral nomadism through \u201cscientific\u00a0management\u201d of grasslands and present strategies to overcome\u00a0local cultural \u201cobstacles\u201d (Lafitte 1998b).<\/p>\n

Documented interviews with Tibetan refugees in\u00a0Dharamsala verify that there is widespread concern over\u00a0the policy of fencing and the permanent settlement of\u00a0nomadic communities. Natural movement of livestock has\u00a0been practiced by the nomads for centuries but this policy\u00a0change has caused social conflicts among Tibetan herding\u00a0communities leading to regional instability and sometimes\u00a0even the loss of life. At least 29 Tibetan nomads lost their\u00a0lives due to a series of armed clashes over pasture lands\u00a0(TIN 1999c).<\/p>\n

SOCIAL ISSUES<\/strong><\/p>\n

Feeding Chinese settlers<\/strong>
\nThe inequality of food subsidies makes living in \u2018TAR\u2019 more\u00a0attractive to Chinese settlers while making it harder for poor\u00a0Tibetans to survive in the way to which they were traditionally\u00a0accustomed. Most of the subsidised items are foodstuff\u00a0that is preferred by Chinese settlers rather than Tibetans.\u00a0The staple diet of Tibetans is barley; however, it is only the\u00a0two grains forming the staple diet of the majority of Chinese\u00a0immigrants \u2014 rice and wheat \u2014 that are subsidised.<\/p>\n

Shifting Policies<\/strong>
\nThe Chinese government\u2019s frequent changes in policy have\u00a0severely affected the livelihood of Tibetan pastoralists. Since\u00a01949, ill-conceived policies were enforced which ignored\u00a0local conditions and were aimed at growing crops \u00a0particularly grain crops \u2014 in all regions regardless of climatic\u00a0and land conditions. Traditional production systems suited\u00a0to local conditions were abandoned (Bidhartsang 1998).<\/p>\n

Compulsory Fertiliser Purchase<\/strong>
\nNew regulations require farmers to increase wheat production,\u00a0especially winter wheat, which requires heavy applications\u00a0of chemical fertiliser that Tibetan farmers believe depletes\u00a0the soil (Grunfeld 1987). However, they are compelled\u00a0to purchase fertiliser at fixed state prices, as part payment\u00a0for grain procured by state trading companies.This reduces their income, their power to pay for health\u00a0and education benefits and discourages organic farming.<\/p>\n

Increasing Human Pressure<\/strong>
\nAccording to Qu, Chairman of the Environment Protection\u00a0Committee of the Chinese National People\u2019s Congress,\u00a0and Li, an advisor to the Chinese National Environment\u00a0Protection Agency:\u00a0A delicate balance exists between human population\u00a0density and biomass productivity. By internationally\u00a0accepted standards, a typical grassland area may\u00a0support five persons per sq.km. On an average, Inner\u00a0Mongolia\u2019s population density is home to 15 persons\u00a0per sq.km. If that density is taken as a standard, the\u00a0eastern regions of Tibet, which have absorbed the\u00a0Chinese influx, now mostly support excessive\u00a0numbers.<\/p>\n

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES<\/strong><\/p>\n

Overgrazing<\/strong>
\nThe stocking rates on the Tibetan grasslands are today being\u00a0pushed to the limit as a result of the 36 per cent increase in\u00a0China\u2019s herds (ICJ 1997). As a result, pastures are overgrazed\u00a0in many areas and livestock have difficulty in finding nutritious\u00a0pasture and have consequently lost weight. For examexample,\u00a0in Amdo, the average weight of an adult yak dropped\u00a0from 112 kilograms in 1965 to 40 kg in 1981 (64 percent\u00a0decrease).<\/p>\n

Specific cases of grassland degradation are related to extensive\u00a0areas being enclosed for Chinese settlers and farmers.\u00a0Such interventions affect the nomads\u2019 traditional migration\u00a0patterns and restrict them to ever-smaller areas which leads\u00a0to conditions of irreversible damage. This deterioration has\u00a0reached a point where if conservation measures are not\u00a0taken soon, the longterm continuity of nomadic Tibetan\u00a0civilisation is threatened.<\/p>\n

Degradation of Grassland<\/strong>
\nThe most significant threat to the herders is the increasing\u00a0level of grassland degradation as the pastures are no longer\u00a0able to produce sufficient cover to feed livestock. Although\u00a0there are no reliable figures for the extent of the degradation\u00a0of grassland, some reports have quoted percentages of a\u00a0loss of between 17.2 per cent (Xinhua 1998j) and over 30\u00a0per cent (US Embassy 1996d) of grassland in the \u2018TAR\u2019.<\/p>\n

Official Chinese literature blames it on the grazing\u00a0traditions of the nomads. But it is an irrefutable fact that\u00a0nomads\u2019 traditional pasture strategies have allowed them to\u00a0survive and prosper for centuries on the high plateau. So\u00a0inappropriate goverment policies are to blame for grassland\u00a0degradation..<\/p>\n

Seasonal Pasture Shortages<\/strong>
\nEven though the Tibetan nomads have accumulated a wealth\u00a0of experience in the use of rangelands and seasonal migration\u00a0management systems are well adapted to local conditions,\u00a0many problems like shortages of pastures have arisen\u00a0from uneven distribution of seasonal pastures. This shortage\u00a0of such pastures has led to overstocking in winter areas\u00a0and, therefore, insufficient nutritional provisions for the livestock\u00a0during the winter (Wu 1997).<\/p>\n

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND NEEDS<\/strong>
\nTibet\u2019s population will continue to grow through Chinese\u00a0migration at a relatively high rate and the consumption level\u00a0of the population will increase, while the availability of land\u00a0suitable for agriculture remains limited. But the prospect\u00a0will not be so bleak if policy correction is embarked upon\u00a0to redress the problems now.<\/p>\n

The degradation of agricultural resources can no longerbe regarded solely as a localised problem since the implications\u00a0are widespread, affecting regional, national and international\u00a0interests. Intensive use of land through changing\u00a0land-use patterns should be encouraged, provided the interests\u00a0of Tibetans and environmental conditions are taken\u00a0into consideration. Also there is the need to encourage diversification\u00a0of income for farmers through off-farm\u00a0activities.<\/p>\n

The Chinese government\u2019s centralised agricultural policy\u00a0should be decentralised since it entirely ignores Tibet\u2019s local\u00a0conditions, environment and the habits of the people. Increases\u00a0in agricultural yields also depend upon improved\u00a0agricultural techniques and not only on bringing more land\u00a0under agriculture. This will require considerable new\u00a0investment in the land and people skills. Training should be\u00a0provided for Tibetans to use better agricultural tools and\u00a0techniques. Studies on farmers\u2019 behaviour also should be\u00a0made as this plays an important role in agricultural and rural\u00a0development.<\/p>\n

Protection of grassland is vital to the survival of Tibetans.\u00a0There is a need for educational conservation programmes\u00a0which convey the spiritual and economic benefits\u00a0of good resource management. Such programmes should\u00a0involve Tibetans, natural resource experts and others. Issues\u00a0of overgrazing and degraded ranges can be addressed\u00a0through joint efforts of herders and researchers, so that\u00a0rangeland ecosystems and pastoral production systems will\u00a0be better understood and conserved in the future.<\/p>\n

Tibetan pastoralists\u2019 experience and deep understanding\u00a0of the environment should govern policy decisions about\u00a0grassland management. Policy reforms at all levels should\u00a0consider the basic needs of local people and provide direct\u00a0economic benefits to them. Incentives for rural development\u00a0must be oriented towards improving living standards\u00a0and conserving biodiversity.<\/p>\n

Studies on the environment and development of the Tibetan\u00a0Plateau are essential not only to fill the enormous\u00a0gaps of knowledge on these dynamic, millennia-old\u00a0ecosystems, but also to provide data that will enable the\u00a0evaluation, by rational methods, of sustainable development\u00a0strategies.<\/p>\n

The preservation of nomads\u2019 extensive traditional knowledge\u00a0of their natural environment, as well as the breeding\u00a0and management skills of domestic and wild animals, remains\u00a0vital. This knowledge should be fully investigated\u00a0and integrated into the planning and implementation of development\u00a0projects.<\/p>\n

Herd diversification should be practised as an insurance\u00a0against major outbreaks of disease, since different domestic\u00a0species are generally not susceptible to the same pathogens.\u00a0Strengthening a sense of community and personal responsibility\u00a0is the key to the conservation of biodiversity and the\u00a0rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems. The use and conservation\u00a0of rangeland ecosystems should be the exclusive responsibility\u00a0of Tibetan people.<\/p>\n

CONCLUSION<\/strong>
\nAgriculture has historically been the primary source of live\u00a0livelihood\u00a0for over 80 per cent of the total population of Tibet.\u00a0Until the late 1950s, Tibetans survived on the principle Tibetan\u00a0crop, barley, plus vegetables, meat and animal bi-products.\u00a0Trade was based on a barter system where the nomads\u00a0exchanged their products like wool and salt for grains\u00a0from farmers. The systems of agriculture and trade prior\u00a0to the Chinese occupation sustained both humans and nature\u00a0to a much greater degree.<\/p>\n

Due to the Chinese occupation, Tibetans are now facing\u00a0many hardships like food scarcity, heavy taxation, centralised\u00a0and frequent changes of policy, lack of Tibetan participation\u00a0in \u201cdevelopment projects\u201d and the transfer of thousands\u00a0of Chinese settlers. All changes were introduced in the guise\u00a0of \u201cmodernisation\u201d and \u201cdevelopment of Tibet and\u00a0Tibetans\u201d.<\/p>\n

Although the Chinese government forced the cultivation\u00a0of winter wheat on marginal lands, coaxing Tibetans away\u00a0from their staple crop of barley, this crop change failed as it\u00a0was unsuitable for local conditions. All the agricultural planning\u00a0and decision-making in Tibet today is imposed from\u00a0above. Production growth rates and net returns remain low\u00a0because farmers receive no incentives for increasing production.\u00a0Most of the produce is forcibly collected as taxes\u00a0in various forms.<\/p>\n

The issue of grassland in Tibet is centred around the\u00a0sustainability of pastoral-nomadism which hitherto depended \u00a0on the policies that would support restoration and preservation\u00a0of a sound grassland ecosystem. Over 60 per cent of\u00a0pastoral-nomadic counties in the \u2018TAR\u2019 are faced with extensive\u00a0rangeland degradation caused by overgrazing, imbalances\u00a0in the grassland food chain and the Chinese policy\u00a0encouraging commercial exploitation of rangelands.<\/p>\n

For the future it is important that the present arable land\u00a0and pastures are conserved and utilised by following\u00a0appropriate cropping patterns and grassing systems, as Tibet\u00a0has the potential to meet future demands for food selfsufficiency\u00a0and other basic needs. The most fundamental\u00a0requirement is that there must be clarity and consistency on\u00a0land policies so that farmers and nomads feel secure about\u00a0their land rights. Agricultural sectors should be gradually\u00a0decentralised while drastic revisions are needed in the areas\u00a0of cropping patterns and price reforms. The active\u00a0participation of both the farmers and nomads in all aspects
\nof the development process is necessary.<\/p>\n

Source: Tibet 2000 Environment and Development Issues\/DIIR<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Chinese Agrarian Change Ever since 1951, immediately after China occupied Tibet,\u00a0a series of changes were imposed. These agrarian changes\u00a0can be studied under three different phases. The first stage,\u00a0Democratic Reform (1951-1965), was short-lived and the\u00a0implementation of…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-779","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-agricluture"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/779","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=779"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/779\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":802,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/779\/revisions\/802"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=779"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=779"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=779"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}