{"id":570,"date":"2014-06-18T10:54:30","date_gmt":"2014-06-18T05:24:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tibetnature.lhasocialwork.com\/en\/?p=570"},"modified":"2014-06-21T13:59:53","modified_gmt":"2014-06-21T08:29:53","slug":"570","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/570\/","title":{"rendered":"Current Situation"},"content":{"rendered":"

YAMDROK TSO<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yamdrok Tso (Yamdrok Lake) is situated 100 km southwest\u00a0of Lhasa at an elevation of 4,441 metres. It has a\u00a0catchment area of 6,100 sq. km and a surface area of 678\u00a0sq. km. The lake is almost a closed system with only a small\u00a0tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo River flowing out from it.Inflow is from precipitation and snow melt from surrounding\u00a0mountains. The lake, a resting place for many migrating birds crossing\u00a0the Tibetan Plateau and then the Himalayas, is also a habitat\u00a0for many native species including the endangered blacknecked\u00a0crane. In addition it is one of Tibet\u2019s four most\u00a0sacred lakes and the famous Samding monastery is situated\u00a0on its shores. The Tibetans regard it as a \u201clife power lake\u201d\u00a0and the resting place of the spirit of the Tibetan nation. A\u00a0legend holds that if Yamdrok Tso should dry up then the\u00a0whole population of Tibet will meet their death (Free Tibet\u00a0Campaign, 1996).<\/p>\n

A 90 Megawatt pumped-storage hydropower plant has\u00a0been constructed; it began trial operations in 1997 and was\u00a0officially reported to be fully operational in September 1998\u00a0(Xinhua , 19 September 1998). Tibet\u2019s extraordinary topography has enabled the designers\u00a0to use Yamdrok Tso as a reservoir to generate hydroelectricity\u00a0without having to build a dam. Instead, six km-long tunnels\u00a0have been bored through the sides of the lake to a\u00a0powerhouse situated next to the Yarlung Tsangpo River 850\u00a0metres below.<\/p>\n

First, there is no reservoir to catch the water pumped\u00a0out of Yamdrok Tso. The water from the lake drains into\u00a0the Yarlung Tsangpo River and when water is pumped back,\u00a0it is Yarlung Tsangpo water that is used. The lake\u2019s water,\u00a0which is oligotrophic (high in minerals and low in nitrates), is\u00a0very different to that of the river\u2019s and the mixing of the\u00a0two could have adverse ecological impacts. The pH in the\u00a0lake is 9.11 while in the river it is 8.13, indicating that the\u00a0river is slightly more acid than the lake. The total\u00a0mineralisation in the lake is 1941 mg per litre as compared\u00a0to only 174 mg per litre in the river. The nitrate concentration\u00a0in the Yarlung Tsangpo in 1983-84 was found to be 0.65\u00a0mg per litre, which may have increased since and may increase\u00a0further given the rising population upstream and increasing\u00a0intensification of agriculture.In the lake, the nitrate\u00a0concentration is only 0.16mg per liter. The replenishing of\u00a0Yamdrok Tso water with Yarlung Tsangpo water could\u00a0increase acidity and nitrate levels.<\/p>\n

The lake, which has been a closed system for centuries,\u00a0will begin to change in its basic properties. The aquatic\u00a0organisms in the lake have adapted to the unique conditions\u00a0over millennia. In a very short time that ecosystem, which\u00a0has never been properly studied, will alter radically (Stockman\u00a0and Seibert 1997).<\/p>\n

A second contention with this project is that the installed\u00a0capacity of the plant (90 Megawatt) is the largest on the\u00a0grid. This is very unusual in the light of pumped-storage\u00a0requiring base load stations to provide off-peak power for\u00a0return pumping. The installed capacity of the Lhasa grid is\u00a0increasing with new stations coming on line in the near future.<\/p>\n

The utility of such a large and expensive plant is thus\u00a0called into question. If it is to be used as a pumped-storage\u00a0plant, it appears to provide no gain for the Lhasa grid, which\u00a0the plant is supposed to service. But if not the lake will be\u00a0drained to provide a net gain of power. This will cause a\u00a0water level drop of between six centimetres to 60 centimetres\u00a0annually, depending on the rate of utilisation (Stockman and\u00a0Seibert 1997). This too would have a devastating effect on\u00a0the lake, reducing the area and quality of shallows around\u00a0the edges which are necessary for the nesting of waterfowl.\u00a0Shrinking the lake area could also increase salinity, which\u00a0may affect wildlife adversely.<\/p>\n

Protest against the plant at Yamdrok Tso has been strident\u00a0from both within, and outside, Tibet. The late Panchen Lama\u00a0protested strongly and construction was stopped for a while\u00a0in the mid-eighties. Shortly after his death in 1989 work was\u00a0resumed. After much lobbying from The International\u00a0Committee of Lawyers for Tibet and the Free Tibet\u00a0Campaign and others, the International Union for the\u00a0Conservation of Nature (IUCN) passed a resolution at its\u00a0World Conservation Congress in 1996 which called upon\u00a0China to \u201cstrengthen their effort of co-operation with the\u00a0international community in exchange of information,\u00a0including that related to the local environment at Yamdrok\u00a0Tso\u2026 consider establishing a nature reserve at Yamdrok\u00a0Tso \u2026[and] \u2026calls upon the IUCN commissions to work\u00a0with China in identifying areas of collaboration on maintaining\u00a0the ecological health of Yamdrok Tso\u201d (IUCN 1996). So\u00a0far little progress has been made between the IUCN and\u00a0the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the waters of Yamdrok\u00a0Tso are draining into the Yarlung Tsangpo River.<\/p>\n

Over-Fishing<\/strong>
\nThe Chinese have described Yamdrok Tso as the \u201cFish Barn\u00a0of Tibet\u201d. In 1960 the reported catch was 255,000 kg. In\u00a01994 it was 1.04 million kg. A fish-powder factory was set\u00a0up in Ngari in 1993 with an annual output of 70 tons (Zhang\u00a01997). Restrictions have also been placed on catches in the\u00a0Lhasa River, in which fish over 250 grams can apparently\u00a0no longer be caught due to previous over-fishing. Carp has\u00a0been introduced from China and is generally bred in ponds\u00a0in Lhasa (Zhang 1997). Concerns have been expressed byTibetans, and more recently by China, about the sustainability\u00a0of the catch and practises such as the use of explosives and\u00a0electric fishing have recently been banned.<\/p>\n

MEKONG AND SALWEEN WATERSHEDS<\/strong>
\nThe Mekong has its sources in Amdo in a remote part of\u00a0the Thangla Mountains. The Salween has its sources around\u00a0the town of Nagchu in the northern part of the \u2018TAR\u2019. The\u00a0Salween travels east until it nears the eastern town of\u00a0Chamdo where it starts to head south towards Khawakarpo\u00a0Mountains to flow into the Tibetan town of Tseka, running\u00a0nearly parallel with the Mekong. The two rivers continue\u00a0this south, southeast direction into Yunnan Province and\u00a0then separate their courses, the Gyalmo Ngulchu running\u00a0into Burma to become the Salween and the Zachu later\u00a0joined by Ngomchu entering Laos to become the Mekong.<\/p>\n

The Mekong is currently the focus of a massive\u00a0international development plan involving China, Thailand,\u00a0Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.\u00a0A 34 metres high dam at Chalong in Nagchu Prefecture\u00a0is the largest dam on the Salween in Tibet according to our\u00a0information. The Chamdo-Jinhe Power Station on the\u00a0Mekong was originally completed in the 1970s. The dam\u00a0was recently upgraded as part of the \u201c62 Aid Projects\u201d with\u00a0new equipment to increase efficiency and new power lines\u00a0running to the Yulong Copper Mine. The next stage in the\u00a0development of the Chamdo-Jinhe Power Station is to install\u00a0a 60,000 kW generation set.<\/p>\n

There is no available information on the size of this dam\u00a0but the future installed capacity of 60,000 kW suggests it is\u00a0large. In the Chinese propaganda magazine China\u2019s Tibet Vol.7\u00a0No.2, Li Mingsen reports that, \u201cefforts are being made to\u00a0construct more power plants for the formation of a power\u00a0grid centred around the Mekong in the 21st century\u201d. There\u00a0are no details of these plans as yet, but it is known from\u00a0proposed mining activity in the area that the focus of this\u00a0development will be mining, which has its own adverse impact\u00a0for the Mekong.<\/p>\n

Toxic Metals In Rivers<\/strong>
\nMining poses a significant pollution threat to water bodies\u00a0but the severity depends upon the degree of care taken to\u00a0mitigate such impacts. The main problem is the threat posed\u00a0by the careless disposal of tailings which contain heavy\u00a0metals, ores and leaching agents. Waste materials from mining\u00a0are often piled up outside the mine and can contain pyrite\u00a0and sulphide minerals which, when exposed to the atmosphere\u00a0and water, may produce sulphuric acid. Sulphuric acid in\u00a0the tailings can leach out other heavy metals\u00a0left behind in the process. These can pass\u00a0into the water table or become washed into\u00a0water bodies during storms.<\/p>\n

In addition to sulphuric acid, these\u00a0solutions may contain heavy metals such\u00a0as silver, cadmium, cobalt, copper, mercury,\u00a0manganese, molybdenum, nickel, lead, zinc,
\narsenic, antimony, and selenium. Some of\u00a0these are highly toxic to humans and wildlife\u00a0alike. Improper storage of mine tailings and ineffective\u00a0containment of contaminated waters can lead to these\u00a0pollutants entering water bodies and decimating life in rivers\u00a0for hundreds of miles. Dilution depends on the quantity\u00a0and quality of water supply and concentration of the\u00a0pollutants (US EPA 1994).<\/p>\n

China\u2019s record for implementing pollution control at\u00a0mines, especially in Tibet, is lax and has led to severe pollution\u00a0of water bodies. At the International Symposium on the\u00a0\u2018Qinghai Tibet Plateau\u2019 [Tibetan Plateau] in Xining, 24 July\u00a01998, two Chinese scientists from the Commission for\u00a0Integrated Survey of Natural Resources reported of mining\u00a0operations in Amdo. This is often the typical procedure at mines in Tibet, and\u00a0it constitutes a serious waste of resources and an equally\u00a0serious risk to the health of people and wildlife, both locally\u00a0and downstream.<\/p>\n

Clear-Cutting In Eastern Tibet<\/strong>
\nForest erosion on the Tibetan Plateau has a history of at\u00a0least 5,000 years (Winkler 1999). A thousand years ago,\u00a0juniper forests existed in the Lhasa valley but they have
\nlargely disappeared due to natural and human factors (Miehe\u00a01998). This would suggest that there would have been a\u00a0steady increase in the silt load of Tibet\u2019s rivers, particularly\u00a0the Yarlung Tsangpo, over this period. It is unclear how\u00a0quickly the landscape may have changed during that period.<\/p>\n

However, the barren state of the upper reaches of the\u00a0Yarlung Tsangpo is a contributing factor to the river\u2019s\u00a0extraordinarily high silt load.\u00a0The Chamdo area of Kham province, which includes\u00a0significant portions of the Mekong and Salween watersheds,\u00a0was once home to extensive cold-temperate forests, largely\u00a0of juniper, pines and spruce. It is relevant to state that in\u00a0the Chamdo area logging practises have been unsustainable\u00a0and this may pose a threat to the hydrology of these vital\u00a0Asian rivers.
\nClear-cutting has been the norm in these areas and\u00a0associated soil erosion correspondingly high. Countries\u00a0downstream planning hydro-development on the Mekong
\nor Salween should be aware of the threat of increasing\u00a0siltation.<\/p>\n

Yellow River Watershed<\/strong><\/p>\n

The headwaters of the great Yellow River \u2014 known as\u00a0Machu to the Tibetans and Huanghe to the Chinese \u2014 lies\u00a0entirely within the Amdo region of Tibet. From Amdo the
\nriver flows into the arid North China Plain. Heavy utilisation\u00a0is creating an emerging water shortage in North China and\u00a0developments along the Yellow River may be to blame.<\/p>\n

The Yellow River has run dry each year with the dry\u00a0period becoming progressively longer; in 1996 it was dry\u00a0for 133 days and in 1997, a year exacerbated by drought, it\u00a0failed to reach the sea for 226 days and its 1998 annual dry\u00a0period was 137 days (SEPA 1999; Brown 1998). The amount\u00a0of water flowing down the Yellow River in Amdo at present\u00a0is 23 per cent less than that in the 1970s, which is one of\u00a0the main factors causing drying up of the river in its lower\u00a0reaches (China Daily 1999a). For long stretches it did not\u00a0even reach Shandong Province, the area growing one-fifth\u00a0of China\u2019s corn and one-seventh of its wheat, depends on\u00a0the Yellow River for half of its irrigation water (Brown\u00a01998).<\/p>\n

Unconstrained development in Amdo on the upper reaches\u00a0of the Yellow River is exacerbating the situation in China as\u00a0well as causing widespread environmental degradation in\u00a0Amdo. The deteriorating environment and lack of rain are\u00a0reported by Xinhua to have caused more than 1,000 lakes
\nto dry up in a region of Amdo around the Yellow River\u2019s\u00a0source (Xinhua, 7 April 1999). Amdo has experienced\u00a0intensive industrialisation and population transfer since the\u00a0Chinese invasion. A former pastoral heartland of Tibet, it\u00a0has been transformed into a landscape of factories, dams,\u00a0big cities, large mechanised farms, laogais (forced labour\u00a0camps), mining operations and oil wells. Towns have sprung\u00a0up in places where only nomads once camped, and the new\u00a0population is predominantly Chinese.<\/p>\n

While many areas retain the designation of \u201cTibet\u00a0Autonomous County\u201d the reality is that the burgeoning\u00a0Chinese population dominate most counties and Tibetans\u00a0have little or no say in \u201cthe development plans\u201d.<\/p>\n

The focus of industrial development in Amdo\u00a0(Ch.Qinghai) is on mineral extraction and processing. Amdo\u00a0boasts China\u2019s biggest potash fertiliser plant, the biggest\u00a0asbestos production base, and the second biggest lead and\u00a0zinc mine.<\/p>\n

The impact of this industrial development\u00a0came to light in 1996 when authorities\u00a0announced the desperate state of the\u00a0Huangshi River valley, a tributary of the\u00a0Yellow River. The area contains 60 per cent of Amdo\u2019s\u00a0population, industrial and agricultural output on only 2.2\u00a0per cent of the province\u2019s total landmass.<\/p>\n

This is an example of how industrial development in Tibet\u00a0has been carried out in an uncontrolled and careless fashion\u00a0resulting in severe environmental degradation. The rivers\u00a0are choked with eroded soil and industrial pollutants. They\u00a0are also being destroyed by massive dams and diversions.\u00a0In order to power the industrial drive in Amdo, an\u00a0extensive network of major hydroelectric power stations\u00a0has been built, some of which are amongst the largest in\u00a0China. Vast areas of pastoral and agricultural land have been
\ninundated by reservoirs. Nomads have been disenfranchised\u00a0by the fragmentation of their range lands. The main focus\u00a0of this development in the coming years will be the \u201cUpper\u00a0Yellow River Cascade\u201d. This consists of 15 major dams\u00a0which are projected to generate 13,462MW. Five of these\u00a0were supposedly completed in 1992 and two more were\u00a0under construction (Cheng 1994). It would appear that the\u00a0two major dams discussed below are part of this scheme, as\u00a0well as many of those under construction or planned (see\u00a0table 3).<\/p>\n

The two biggest projects operating on the Upper Machu\u00a0(Yellow River) in Amdo \u2014 and some of the abuses reported\u00a0by Tibetans that have resulted from the construction and\u00a0operation of these plants \u2014 are discussed here. The\u00a0environmental impact of these dams is far-reaching. In\u00a0general, these huge projects are turning the Machu into a\u00a0series of semi-stagnant water bodies. The release of water\u00a0into the river is largely dependent on the demand for\u00a0electricity generation and follows no natural pattern. The\u00a0river\u2019s ecosystem is breaking down, causing a sharp drop in\u00a0biodiversity. Conflicting needs along the basin \u2014 between\u00a0electricity generation, irrigation and water supply for industrial\u00a0and domestic use in cities \u2014 are pushing the Yellow River\u00a0to crisis point.<\/p>\n

Tsanga Gag<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tsanga Gag or Tsanga Dam (Ch. Longyangxia) is located to\u00a0the south of the Tso Ngonpo in Tsolho (Ch. Hainan) County\u00a0between Chabcha (Ch. Gonghe) and Trika (Ch. Guide) on\u00a0the Machu (Yellow River) and was completed in the late\u00a01980s and stands a staggering 178 metres high. This makes\u00a0it the largest dam in Tibet and the second biggest in China\u00a0after Ertan in Sichuan, which will remain the biggest until\u00a0the Three Gorges project is complete. Tsanga Gag reservoir\u00a0can store the entire flow of the Machu for three whole\u00a0months (Tsering 1998). This creates a reservoir covering a\u00a0surface area of 393 sq. km (Wang 1984).<\/p>\n

The powerhouse has an installed capacity of 1280\u00a0Megawatt producing 5.8 billion kWh annually. It took 30,000\u00a0Chinese workers to construct the dam which cost 1.769\u00a0billion yuan (US$221.12 million). Around 10,000 people who\u00a0were displaced from prime agricultural land to make way\u00a0for the reservoir were allocated land in formerly pastoral\u00a0areas which they had to convert to farmland. They were\u00a0supported by the government for two years after which they\u00a0had to achieve self sufficiency (Tsering 1998). On top of\u00a0this the dam brought over 100,000 Chinese workers to Amdo,\u00a0many of whom stayed there, thereby increasing pressure on\u00a0the dwindling natural resources (ICT 1992).<\/p>\n

Tibetans have seen little benefit from this project as much\u00a0of the power goes to military bases and cities dominated by\u00a0Chinese inhabitants and state-owned industries.\u00a0The provision of power spawns development that has,\u00a0in turn, consumed ever-increasing quantities of Tibetan land\u00a0and resources, caused pollution and excluded Tibetans from\u00a0the economy. The Longyang Gorge where the dam is located is 1,688 km from the source of the Yellow River. It is the\u00a0first in a series of 15 dams to be located downstream of\u00a0Longyang, between Longyang and Qingtong. Upstream from\u00a0Longyang, which is all Tibetan territory, there are future\u00a0plans for a chain of 12 more power stations between the\u00a0source and Longyang. These are expected to be installed\u00a0with a total of 6,330 Megawatt capacity (Bian 1987).<\/p>\n

Ngogyai Gag<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ngogyai Gag or Ngogyai dam (Ch. Lijiaxia) went into full\u00a0operation early in 1998 (International Water Power & Dam\u00a0Construction, March 1998). The 165 metres high and 420\u00a0metres long dam wall holds back 1.65 billion cubic metres\u00a0of water and is the third of the 15 plants planned as a\u00a0cascade between Longyang and Qingtong. It is situated 109\u00a0km downstream from Tsanga Gag on the borders of Chentsa\u00a0Tibetan Autonomous County and Hualong Hui Autonomous\u00a0County in Amdo.<\/p>\n

The reservoir inundated at least 430 hectares of land\u00a0and involved the relocation of at least 4,012 people. To\u00a0give an idea of the level of earthworks and construction at\u00a0such large dams, Ngogyai Gag construction involved 4.5\u00a0million cubic metres of rock and earth excavation; 3.25\u00a0million cubic metres of concrete placement; 4.8 million cubic\u00a0metres of earthworks; 144,000 metres of consolidation\u00a0grouting; 47,000 metres of drilling for curtain grouting; and\u00a010,000 tons of metal works (Huang 1996). More than 20,000\u00a0Chinese workers worked at the dam site and many settled\u00a0permanently afterwards (Tsering 1998).<\/p>\n

Tsanga Gag and Ngogyai Gag are the largest dams\u00a0currently operating in Amdo. According to Xinhua in 1992\u00a0there were 156 medium and small hydropower stations\u00a0operating in Amdo with a combined annual output of 236\u00a0million kWh.<\/p>\n

\u00a0The damming of the Machu River and its tributaries in\u00a0Amdo has uprooted tens of thousands of people from their\u00a0homes and is expected to move thousands more. The loss\u00a0of agricultural and pastoral land has uprooted Tibetan\u00a0communities from their traditional economic base. The\u00a0environmental impacts associated with the economic\u00a0development accompanying these projects are far reaching.\u00a0Mining and associated processing industries are the main\u00a0benefactors of power from these dams as Amdo Province\u00a0has become a major centre of the metallurgic industries. A\u00a0lack of regulations has led to severe water and atmospheric pollution in the province while power has facilitated the\u00a0expansion of major cities, consuming more and more land\u00a0in a region that used to be occupied by nomads and their\u00a0temporary camps.<\/p>\n

\u00a0In interviews with recently-exiled Tibetans in Dharamsala\u00a0in July 1998, refugees from Amdo told of how water was\u00a0released from dams in the region without warning, posing\u00a0great dangers to people living downstream. People working\u00a0in fields by the rivers are drowned in flash floods and houses\u00a0and farm buildings are often washed away. Many claimed\u00a0they have never received any compensation for these losses.\u00a0One man spoke of how his family had to give up farming\u00a0and become road labourers as their land was so often washed\u00a0away by these sudden releases from dams that it became\u00a0unusable.<\/p>\n

The utilisation of the Machu River and its tributaries in\u00a0Amdo appears to be taking place at a rate that implies\u00a0maximum exploitation. There seems to be no consideration \u00a0of sustainable development, no consideration of the wishes\u00a0and aspirations of local people, and no consideration of the\u00a0long-term survival of the river\u2019s ecosystem. Tibetans in Amdo\u00a0express concern for the future viability of such development\u00a0and equal consternation over the safety of people living\u00a0around these projects who suffer frequent inundation from\u00a0rising reservoirs and flash floods associated with dam\u00a0releases.<\/p>\n

The Upper Yangtze Watershed<\/strong><\/p>\n

The source of the Drichu (Yangtze River) lies deep withinAmdo in the Thangla Mountains (Ch. Tanggula) and it runs through Tibet for more than 2,000 km of its 6,380 km length. It is the longest river in Tibet and the third longest river in the world after the Amazon and Nile (DIIR 1995). The catchment area of the Yangtze and the regions to its south contain 82 per cent of China\u2019s total volume of water flow, but only 36 per cent of its cultivated land (Chen and Edmonds 1989). While the river and its main tributaries, the Yalong Chu and Daduchu, rise from Amdo, the Yalong and Dadu lie east of the main channel and enter Kham (western Sichuan) before joining the Yangtze in the Chengdu Plain.<\/p>\n

In Sichuan and beyond the Yangtze is extensively dammed, as are some of its main tributaries such as the Dadu and Yalong. China\u2019s biggest dam in operation, the massive World Bank-funded Ertan Dam (240 metres) is located on the Yalongchu just before it meets the Yangtze. The construction of the projects themselves incurs a large toll on the local environment, involving massive earthworks and road building. Further, it attracts migrant labourers, who become established in new towns with new transport links, and facilitate industrial development and settlement upstream.<\/p>\n

In Kham, where forests and wildlife are coming under increasing pressure, dam-building is the next step on the path to increasing environmental destruction. The establishment of a power source in one place attracts new settlements and new industries (such as resource-intensive paper and pulp mills), and upstream areas become the focus of further development.<\/p>\n

Among the schemes to build many major dams on the Upper Yangtze and its tributaries there is also a plan to divert water from the upper reaches to supplement the ever decreasing flows in the Yellow River. This plan envisages taking water from the main stream and the Yalong River from a point on the Tibetan Plateau (Zhang 1989).<\/p>\n

Forest Loss and Water Loss<\/strong>
\nWhile the development of a network of hydropower projects\u00a0in the Upper Drichu watershed is supposed to include flood\u00a0protection facilities, this has been severely\u00a0frustrated by massive deforestation which\u00a0increases the impact of flooding greatly.\u00a0In the summer of 1998, the Yangtze\u00a0reached record flood levels, yet actual\u00a0flows were not at a historical high. This\u00a0was analysed as a sure sign that\u00a0deforestation activities upstream were\u00a0causing floods to be more severe, despite\u00a0lower actual water quantities\u00a0Zhuang Guotai, a member of China\u2019s State Environmental\u00a0Protection Agency, told a Chinese newspaper that for every\u00a070,000 hectares of forest lost, a natural reservoir that can\u00a0store one million cubic metres of water is also lost (US\u00a0Embassy in Beijing, August 1998). This gives a vivid insight\u00a0into the potential flood protection provided by leaving forests\u00a0intact.<\/p>\n

Much of the deforestation in the Yangtze watershed has\u00a0taken place in Tibetan areas, with little benefit to the local\u00a0people as most of the wood is trucked out. Only recently\u00a0are the Chinese authorities beginning to realise the true value\u00a0of the Tibetan Plateau and its environs in relation to the\u00a0ecological protection of much of China.<\/p>\n

Flood Deaths<\/strong>
\nThe worst Yangtze flood in China of August 1998 resulted\u00a0in an economic loss of US$37.5 billion and the death of\u00a03,656 people (DIIR 1999a). At a rally on 28 September
\n1998, held in Beijing by the Communist Party to declare\u00a0\u201cvictory\u201d over the disastrous summer floods, President Jiang\u00a0Zemin admitted \u2014 in a significant ideological departure \u2014\u00a0that Communist governments had too often tried to impose\u00a0their will on nature. It was important now, he said, \u201cto\u00a0understand the law of nature, correctly manage it and learn\u00a0how to follow it to facilitate our economic development and\u00a0other social undertakings\u201d (Lawrence 1998).<\/p>\n

The International Red Cross on 4 August 1999 said that\u00a0more than 400 people have been killed and 66 million\u00a0affected by disastrous summer flooding along the Yangtze\u00a0river in August 1999 and an international appeal for\u00a0emergency aid was launched (Inside China Today 1999b).<\/p>\n

Amdo\u2019s Shrinking Lake \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tso Ngonpo (Blue Lake) as it is known to the Tibetans,\u00a0more familiarly known by its Mongol name, Lake Kokonor,<\/p>\n

\"Untitled-1<\/a><\/p>\n

is the largest lake in Tibet. It has a size of 4,460 sq. km and\u00a0is situated at an elevation of 3,197 metres above sea level\u00a0(Chang 1987). It has in recent decades been intensively fished,\u00a0mined for salts and the heavy utilisation of the rivers flowing\u00a0into it may be causing a decline in the water level. In May\u00a01998, World Journal reported that the level of the lake had\u00a0dropped three metres. It is anticipated that within 30 years\u00a0the sandy region of the lake will increase from 450 sq. km\u00a0to 700 sq. km. This is expected to have a major impact on\u00a0birds nesting in the area and on other wildlife (World Journal\u00a014 May 1998).<\/p>\n

Source: www.tibet.net\/Environment and Development Desk,DIIR<\/strong><\/p>\n

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YAMDROK TSO Yamdrok Tso (Yamdrok Lake) is situated 100 km southwest\u00a0of Lhasa at an elevation of 4,441 metres. It has a\u00a0catchment area of 6,100 sq. km and a surface area of 678\u00a0sq. km. The lake…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-570","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-water-resources"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=570"}],"version-history":[{"count":27,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":603,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570\/revisions\/603"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=570"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=570"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tibetnature.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=570"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}